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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a 
tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the  phenomena 
of “being settled on” and of “settling” a course of action. My intention to 
attend a conference this weekend settles in my mind the issue of what 
to do then. It also settles that issue in fact, since it leads me to attend the 
conference this weekend. Many have suggested, in addition, that the cited 
connection supports an important constraint on intention. The constraint, 
to put it simply, is that one may only intend what one takes one’s so intending 
as settling. Thus, one cannot intend to win the lottery if one does not take 
one’s so intending as settling the issue of one’s winning it, as being efficacious 
in causing that result. This condition has traditionally been understood as a 
doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one’s intention as settling 
is what one believes one’s so intending as settling.
In this paper I propose an alternative conception of such a constraint. 
I suggest that we conceive of it in terms of the attitude of reliance, rather 
than of belief. My aim in the paper is three-fold: to clarify the connection 
between intending to act and the phenomena of being settled on and of 
settling a course of action; to provide support for the reliance conception 
of the cited constraint; and to show that this conception drives a wedge in 
the familiar dispute, between doxastic and conative accounts of intention, as 
to whether intending to act necessarily involves the belief that one will so act.
3.2 INTENDING AND SETTLING
In his 1976 article, “Practical Reasoning,” Gilbert Harman calls attention 
to the connection between the ideas of intending and of settling an issue 
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in the following way. “Forming the intention to [φ],” Harman maintains, 
“settles in one’s mind the question whether one is going to [φ]” (1976: 438). 
Intending to act in a certain way settles the issue of one’s so acting in one’s 
practical reasoning. It fixes it in one’s thoughts. Harman also maintains that 
being settled on a course of action in one’s mind can be pragmatically 
advantageous. First, it disposes one not to continue considering the ques-
tion of whether to pursue that action or not, thus allowing one to direct 
one’s attention to other practical matters. Second, it allows one to “take 
for granted” that one will perform that action in any further practical or 
theoretical reasoning (1976: 438); it allows one to do this, Harman thinks, 
since being settled on a course of action involves believing that one will 
carry it out (1976: 432).
The connection between intention and settling is at the core of Michael 
Bratman’s planning theory of intention. For Bratman intention is a distinct 
conative attitude. It is a plan-like attitude that involves “an appropriate sort 
of commitment to action” (1987: 29). This commitment has two dimensions: 
“reasoning-centered” and “volitional” (15). The first, Bratman says, is partly 
captured by our ordinary “talk of being settled on a certain course of action” 
(1987: 16, his emphasis). Like Harman, Bratman thinks that the connection 
between intention and being settled helps to explain the role that this 
attitude plays in one’s practical reasoning. It helps to explain, for example, 
why in intending to act in a certain way one is disposed both to see the issue 
of one’s so acting as a fixed point in one’s deliberations and to engage in 
further reasoning on the basis of that intention—where this includes form-
ing additional intentions concerning means to executing one’s intended 
end, eschewing from further deliberation options believed to be incompat-
ible with one’s intention, and so on (1987: 16–17). The “volitional commit-
ment” of intention concerns, in Bratman’s view, the relation between 
intention and action. If I now intend to perform a certain action later, and 
my intention persists until then and nothing interferes, Bratman says, I will 
normally act then—or, at least, I will try. Thus, my intention to act in a 
certain way tends to settle that I so act. In contrast, Bratman argues, if I 
merely desired now to perform that action later, I might typically not even 
try to satisfy my desire then—and all the while my desire may be function-
ing properly. While intentions are “conduct-controlling” attitudes, Bratman 
concludes, desires are only “potential influencers” of action (1987: 15–16).1
J. David Velleman also has called attention to the existence of a close 
 connection between the ideas of intending and of settling in different writ-
ings. In Practical Reflection (1989), Velleman expresses his agreement with 
1 For a conception of intention along similar lines, see Mele (1992).
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Bratman that intention is a “mental commitment to act” that “settle[s] our 
course” of action (1989: 111). Velleman thinks that it is with respect to 
practical deliberation –the conscious process of forming intentions–that it 
is most natural to talk of a connection between intending and settling. 
Thus, Velleman says that intention “is typically formed at the close of delib-
eration,” where “it settles the practical question, leaving us nothing further 
to deliberate”2 or, similarly, that it can be understood as an “attitude toward 
outcomes that are settled, from [our] perspective, at the close of deliberation” 
(1989: 111). In more recent work (1997), Velleman elaborates further on the 
connection between intending and settling. He claims that intention is “an 
attitude that settles [an] issue both actually and notionally” (32). One’s 
intending to φ “actually” settles the issue of one’s φ-ing in that it tends to 
cause one to φ. And it “notionally” settles that issue in that in so intending 
one becomes “resolved” upon φ-ing in one’s mind—one becomes resolved 
in one’s mind with respect to that issue, Velleman maintains, by “repre-
senting” the issue as being resolved in the world.3 Velleman regards this 
issue-settling (or “issue-resolving”) feature as distinctive of intention. Other 
motivational states, such as the state of having a goal, Velleman contends, 
settle an issue neither in the “actual” sense nor in the “notional” sense. One’s 
having the goal of getting a fellowship may motivate one to pursue the 
means one believes are necessary to attain that goal, Velleman illustrates, 
but it “doesn’t settle whether [one] will in fact get it, nor does it constitute 
[one’s] viewing this issue as settled” (1997: 33).
According to the cited authors, then, intention connects to settling 
phenomena in two ways. First, one’s intending to φ tends to settle the issue of 
one’s φ-ing in the world in that it tends to be causally efficacious—though, 
of course, it may fail to be. This is captured in different ways by Bratman’s 
characterization of intention as a “conduct-controlling attitude” and by 
Velleman’s talk of this attitude as “actually settling” an issue. It is also cap-
tured by Harman’s remarks elsewhere in the cited paper (to which I return 
below) that “in the normal case” intention leads to action (1976: 441–2). 
Second, one’s intending to φ settles the issue of one’s φ-ing in one’s mind in 
the sense of its serving as a fixed point on the basis of which one is disposed 
to further deliberate, plan, and act. This is what Harman’s talk of “settling 
an issue in one’s mind,” Bratman’s talk of “being settled,” and Velleman’s 
talk of “notional” settling all seem to get at.
2 Velleman also says that when an intention is unconsciously formed “it forecloses 
deliberation rather than closes it” (1989: 111, his emphasis).
3 Velleman’s basic idea is that one’s intending to φ involves a special belief that one 
will φ, and that it is this belief that (partly) resolves the issue of one’s φ-ing in one’s mind 
by representing that issue as being resolved in the world. I briefly return to Velleman’s 
idea below.
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Despite agreeing on the existence of the cited two connections, the 
authors disagree on what the second connection exactly involves. Both 
Harman and Velleman maintain that the phenomenon of settling the issue 
of one’s φ-ing in one’s mind involves believing that one will φ, whereas 
Bratman denies this. The disagreement is reflected in, and might also help 
explain, how the cited authors conceive of the seemingly more general rela-
tion between intention and belief. Both Harman and Velleman adhere to 
what we may call a “doxastic account of intention,”4 according to which 
the attitude of intending to φ is a special kind of belief that one will φ or 
necessarily involves such a belief.5 Harman maintains that “[t]he intention 
to [φ] is the intention that, because of that very intention, it is guaranteed 
that one will [φ]” (1976: 441),6 where (a) this (self-referential) intention is—
or, at least involves—the (self-referential) belief that one will φ (453, 432); 
(b) this “intention-belief” is “a conclusion of practical reasoning” (453);7 and 
(c) practical reasoning aims, in a way that theoretical reasoning does not, at 
“the satisfaction of intrinsic desires” (442, 450).8 In a somewhat similar vein, 
Velleman claims that intentions “are self-fulfilling mental representations that 
are adopted out of a desire for their fulfillment and that represent themselves 
as such” (1989: 137). Therefore, since Harman and Velleman conceive of inten-
tion as involving belief in success, and since they also conceive of it—as we 
saw above—as involving the settling of an issue in one’s mind, it is not sur-
prising that they conceive of the latter as involving belief in success as well. 
Most interestingly, Velleman notes that it is precisely this conception of what 
it is to settle an issue in one’s mind that motivates his doxastic account of 
intention. Thus, he declares that “[his] reason for thinking that intention 
entails belief is that it is an attitude from which we view an outcome as settled” 
(1991: 282). Unlike Harman and Velleman, Bratman adheres instead to what 
we may call a “conative account of intention,” according to which intending 
to φ is a conative attitude that need not involve believing that one will φ 
(1987: 37–41). In Bratman’s view, intention is a conative attitude that involves 
a distinctive two-dimensional commitment to action, a commitment that 
can be independent of belief in success. It is constitutive of this conative 
account of intention, then, that one’s “being settled” on a course of action 
does not entail believing that one will succeed in its pursuit.
4 Cf. Langton (2004: 244).
5 There are of course important differences between the doxastic accounts by Harman 
and by Velleman, but we do not need to address them here.
6 Harman uses the terms “guaranteed” and “settled” interchangeably in his 1976 paper. 
However, in later work (1986b: 368) Harman goes on to associate the term “ guaranteed” 
exclusively with what he calls “positive intentions,” discussed on pp. 58–59 below. 
7 Talk of this special belief as an “intention-belief ” comes from Harman (1986b: 374).
8 For further elaboration on this interpretation of Harman’s view of intention, see 
Bratman’s (2009) thorough discussion. Cf. Harman (1986b: 375–6).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 21/06/17, SPi
Facundo M. Alonso54
3.3 FROM THE CONNECTION BETWEEN INTENDING 
AND SETTLING TO A CONSTRAINT ON INTENDING
The cited disagreement notwithstanding, Harman, Velleman, and Bratman all 
seem to think, along with many others, that the connection between intend-
ing and settling establishes—or, at least, is associated with—an important 
constraint on that attitude. Velleman elaborates on this constraint thus. An 
agent can settle “only . . . issues that are (or at least appear to be) up to him” 
and this sets a restriction, given the cited connection between intending and 
settling, on what he may intend (1997: 32, fn. 9). If an issue is, or appears 
to be, up to the agent, then he has the “power to settle” it in deliberation; 
he is able to do it or to not do it as a result of what he decides (1997: 37). 
But if an issue is not, or appears not to be, up to the agent, then he can 
 settle  it neither in his mind nor in the world. In other words, he cannot 
intend it (1997: 33). Things are otherwise with motivational states that lack 
a tight connection to the settling feature described above. You may aim to 
win a research fellowship, Velleman exemplifies, but “you probably cannot 
intend . . . to get [it], since you’re well aware that whether you get [it] isn’t up 
to you” (1997: 32). Similarly, Velleman illustrates, an unskilled marksman 
may have the desire or goal of hitting a target, and fire his gun in order to 
attain that goal, but “he cannot be decided upon hitting it, because the issue 
of his hitting or missing is not sufficiently within his control to be settled by 
his deliberation” (1989: 112).9
Velleman’s interpretation of this constraint is influenced, as he acknow-
ledges,10 by Annette Baier’s early discussion of the objects of intention (1970). 
There Baier proposes what she calls the “principle of the delimited sover-
eignty of intention,” that is, the principle that one may intend only what 
one can do (649, 652) or “initiate” (658, fn. 5). Baier returns to the cited 
principle in later work (1997), but this time she reads it as the principle that 
“[one] cannot intend what [one] believe[s] to be beyond [one’s] power or 
control” (1997: 25, my emphasis), rather than as the principle that one can-
not intend what is beyond one’s power or control.
Velleman and Baier are not alone in thinking that an agent’s beliefs about 
control set a constraint on what he may intend. Harman endorses this idea 
as well. “One cannot intend that something will happen,” Harman avers, 
9 Velleman uses the expressions “up to you,” “within your control,” and the like 
interchangeably. See, for example, (1997: 32, fn. 8). It is likewise with Baier (1970: 649, 
652,  1997: 25) and Harman (1976: 434), cited below. Alternatively, Bratman distin-
guishes between the constraints that relevant ideas of settling and of control set on 
intention, but still sees them as tightly connected (1999a; 2014).
10 Velleman (1997: 32, fn. 9, 1989: 112, fn. 5, 159, fn. 11).
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“if one thinks that whether it will happen or not is entirely outside of 
one’s control” (1976: 452). More positively, Harman points out that “when 
 someone intends that something will happen he thinks of his intention as 
guaranteeing that it will happen” (452). His point, more precisely, is that 
one may intend to φ only if one believes that one’s intention to φ will 
lead one to φ, or, as he also puts it, only if one believes the “conditional 
 proposition” that if one intends to φ, one will φ in fact (1986b: 374, cf. 
Grice 1971: 278–9). The idea that intention is constrained by belief in one’s 
ability to settle an issue is indeed central to Harman’s doxastic account of 
intention (1976; 1986a; 1986b). Notably, it is a key—if somewhat implicit—
premise in one of Harman’s arguments in favor of his “thesis that intention 
involves belief,” that is, the thesis that “[i]f one intends to do something, it 
follows that one believes that one will do it” (1976: 432). That is his argu-
ment from intentional action (1976: 434). Harman thinks that we cannot 
always derive conclusions about what one intends to do from what one 
intentionally does, but that in some cases we can. If we look closely at these 
latter cases, Harman argues, we find support for the thesis that intention 
involves belief. We know that intentional action is constrained by belief in 
ability, and in the cited cases we observe that the intention behind intentional 
action is subject to such a constraint as well. As Harman writes:
[O]ne intentionally wins at chess or intentionally shoots a bulls-eye only if it is up 
to oneself whether one will do it, only if one can do it at will, only if it is something 
that one knows that one can do if one chooses to do it. One intentionally wins a 
chess game or shoots a bulls-eye only if one does so knowing that one is going to do 
so. But knowing involves believing. In such cases, then, one intends to win or to 
shoot a bulls-eye only if one also believes that one will win or shoot a bulls-eye 
(1976: 434).
Harman’s argument in this passage is not fully explicit, but might be 
plausibly interpreted as follows. Harman claims that (a) one intentionally 
φ-s only if one believes that were one to intend to φ, one would φ in fact.11 
Moreover, he seems to make two implicit assumptions. First, he assumes 
that a constraint parallel to (a) applies to intention as well, namely, that 
(b) one intends to φ only if one believes that if one intends to φ, one will 
φ. Second, he assumes that intention is transparent to the mind, namely, 
that (c) if one intends to φ, one believes that one intends to φ.12 Let us next 
assume for the purposes of a conditional proof that (d) one intends to φ. 
11 I think we can safely replace Harman’s talk of “knowledge” in the argument by talk 
of “belief.”
12 As we will see later, this is an assumption Harman makes at various places (1976: 
442, 1986b: 374).
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It follows from (b) and (d) that, (e) one believes that if one intends to φ, one 
will φ. It also follows from (c) and (d) that, (f ) one believes that one intends 
to φ. Then, we get from (e) and (f ) that, (g) one believes that one will φ. 
Therefore, by conditional introduction on (d)–(g), we arrive at the conclu-
sion that one intends to φ only if one believes that one will φ, as desired. 
Thus, in this interpretation, Harman’s assumption concerning the cited 
belief constraint on intention, (b), is key to his argument in favor of the 
thesis that intention involves belief.
From this discussion, then, we see that according to Velleman, Baier, 
and Harman intention is subject to an important constraint that is associated 
with the connection between intending and settling noted in section 3.2. 
But what is the constraint exactly? The cited authors seem to offer two 
different formulations of it. One formulation says that one may intend 
only what one may settle or control; the other that one may intend only 
what one takes oneself to (be in a position to) settle or control—where 
“taking” is a placeholder for a relevant cognitive attitude. The former 
 formulation establishes an objective or external constraint on intending, 
one that connects the possibility of an agent’s intending an action with 
the possibility of his performing it. The latter sets, in contrast, a subjective 
or internal constraint on intending, one that connects how an agent sees 
an issue, as up to him or not, with the possibility of his intending it. The 
constraints are in principle independent of one another. An issue may 
be up to oneself for one to settle it by forming an intention, but one 
may fail to see it that way. Conversely, one may regard an issue as up to 
oneself for one to settle it by forming an intention, but the issue may not 
in fact be so.
Ambivalence notwithstanding, it seems to me that it is the subjective 
formulation of the constraint that Velleman, Baier, and Harman primarily 
have in mind when discussing the restrictions that the feature of settling 
establishes on intending.13 It is also the one Bratman focuses on when 
 discussing the “settle condition” on intention within the context of shared 
agency (1999b: 149), a discussion to which I return below. That is the con-
straint I want to investigate in this paper. My concern is whether some 
13 Some authors suggest that this is the only plausible formulation of the constraint. 
See, for example, Davis (1984: 134). Even if the suggestion is correct, there is still a 
 question as to how to conceptualize the idea of control associated with intending. 
Here I  follow Harman (1976, 1986b) and others in conceptualizing it in terms of the 
conditional proposition that if one intends to φ, one will φ; but I also acknowledge that 
this might be a simplification. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to 
clarify this point.
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version of (to use Bratman’s terminology) the settle condition is in effect 
a plausible constraint on intending. Two points need emphasizing from 
the outset. The first is that the aspect of the settling feature of intention 
that is crucial to the settle condition is that of settling an issue (not just in 
one’s mind but mainly) in the world. The second point is that the settle 
condition has traditionally been conceived of as a doxastic constraint on 
intention, as the remarks by Velleman, Baier, and Harman above testify. 
More precisely, according to the doxastic conception of the settle condition, 
we have that:
Settle Condition–Belief (SCB): One may intend to φ only if one believes that if one 
intends to φ, one will φ in fact.14
I think it is initially plausible to suppose that intention is subject to a relevant 
settle condition. But I think also that there is a question as to what exactly 
explains that intention be so constrained, for it is not obvious what grounds 
the passage from a feature considered central to intending—namely, that 
in intending one settles an issue, as noted in section 3.2—to a cognitive 
constraint on intending associated with such a feature—namely, that in 
order to form an intention, one must take this attitude as settling an issue. 
So, our question is the following: how or why does the settling feature of 
intention get into one’s mind, so to speak, and constrain one’s intention-
forming processes?
Harman offers an answer to this question. He argues that what allow us 
to move from the idea that intention normally settles issues in the world to 
the further idea that intention is subject to an appropriate settle condition 
are basically three assumptions about the nature of intention and practical 
reasoning. One of them is Harman’s “first thesis” that “intention involves 
belief.” A second, and related, assumption is Harman’s idea that practical 
reasoning aims (in part) at “explanatory coherence” (431, 434–5). Harman 
thinks that since intention involves belief, practical reasoning and theoretical 
reasoning are guided by the same norm. Just as in theoretical reasoning 
one aims at increasing the explanatory coherence of one’s overall view of 
the theoretical world, where one such view “is more coherent than another 
to the extent that the first leaves less unexplained than the second” (435), 
Harman argues, in practical reasoning one aims at increasing the explana-
tory coherence of one’s overall view of one’s practical life. Finally, a third 
assumption, implicit in Harman’s argument, is his idea that intention is 
14 Note that although Velleman endorses a doxastic conception of the settle condition, 
his own formulation of it is, as we saw above, a bit stronger than SCB. Compare Baier 
(1970: 657), and Harman on “positive” intentions, below.
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transparent to the mind in that if one intends to φ, one believes that one 
intends to φ.15 Harman summarizes his argument thus:
As the result of practical reasoning, one forms the positive intention of [φ-ing] . . . 
[P]ractical reasoning and theoretical reasoning overlap and . . . considerations of explana-
tory coherence are relevant to both sorts of reasoning. Furthermore, one’s intention 
to [φ] involves the belief that one will [φ]. Since one’s intention is a positive intention, 
one’s practical conclusion has explanatory coherence only if it involves the supposition 
that one’s intention to [φ] will lead to one’s [φ-ing]. Without that supposition, one 
has no reason to think that one will [φ]. So, for reasons of explanatory coherence, 
one can form the positive intention to [φ] only if one can also conclude that one’s 
intention will be instrumental in one’s [φ-ing] (1976: 442).
To be in a position to flesh out this argument, we must elaborate on some 
notions by Harman. In this passage, Harman talks of a “positive” inten-
tion to do something—although he thinks the cited argument applies to 
all  intentions, “positive” or otherwise (441). Harman maintains that one 
has a “positive” intention to φ only if “in the normal case” one’s intention 
to φ “is a means to” one’s φ-ing (440). Here Harman understands the expres-
sion “is a means to” (and its cognates) in a special way, as denoting sufficient 
and necessary conditions. So, in Harman’s view one has a “positive” inten-
tion to φ only if in the normal case one φ-s because, and only because, of this 
very intention (441). Harman contrasts “positive” with “negative” inten-
tions.16 A “negative” intention to φ is normally a sufficient—but not a neces-
sary—condition for one’s φ-ing. Suppose, Harman illustrates, that one 
intends to stay home tonight (439). One may stay home tonight as a result 
of that intention, but one need not have intended to stay home tonight to 
achieve that result. In the normal course of events, one would have stayed 
home without having formed an intention to that effect, so long as one did 
not intend to do something else (439). Thus, Harman concludes, a negative 
intention “is not so much a means . . . to doing what one intends to do, as it 
is a way of ensuring that one will not do something else” (440). For Harman, 
then, both “positive” and “negative” intentions to φ normally settle the issue 
of one’s φ-ing in the world (440); they are both normally a sufficient condi-
tion for one’s φ-ing.17
15 Harman makes this last assumption explicit in a second, related argument he provides 
for the settle condition. This second argument says, roughly, that “rational” (1976: 442) or 
“justified” (1986b: 374–5) intention entails justified belief in the relevant conditional—and 
thus must satisfy the settle condition as well.
16 He also contrasts these two with “conditional” intentions (1976: 440–1), but to 
keep things simple I will not consider the latter here.
17 Compare Velleman’s interpretation of Harman on “negative” intentions (1989: 
96–7, fn. 15).
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Now we can tackle Harman’s argument above. We may usefully interpret 
it as comprising two parts. The first part applies to “positive” and “negative” 
intentions alike. It says that since intending to φ involves believing that one 
will φ, one cannot “coherently” form the intention to φ unless one forms 
the belief that if one intends to φ, one will φ in fact. Only then will one 
have a “coherent” explanation of the fact that one will φ. For in such a case 
one will (a) intend to φ; (b) believe that one intends to φ; (c) believe that 
if one intends to φ, one will φ; and from these last two premises, (b) and 
(c), one will be able to infer and thus (d) believe that one will φ.18 The 
 second part of the argument “concentrate[s] on positive intentions” (441). 
It says that, given the sort of creatures “positive” intentions are, one cannot 
“coherently” form a “positive” intention to φ—that is, one will not have 
a coherent explanation of the fact that one will φ—unless, in addition to 
having the aforementioned attitudes (a)–(d), one (e) believes that one will φ 
only if one intends to φ.
Velleman advances an alternative, and apparently simpler, argument for 
the settle condition. As we saw in section 3.2, Velleman articulates the con-
nection between intending and settling with an eye especially to practical 
deliberation. He claims that intention is an attitude “typically formed at the 
close of deliberation,” whereby “it settles [a] practical question” (1989: 111). 
In like manner, Velleman argues that it is a feature of practical deliberation 
that imposes the settle condition on intention. As he says:
[D]eliberation is a process of settling issues that are open from our perspective, in 
the sense that they are up to us. If an issue isn’t up to us, then there is no point in our 
deliberating about it; if it is up to us, then we are in a position to deliberate about it, 
in order to reach a conclusion from which we view the issue as settled (1991: 282).
In effect, Velleman maintains here that it is in the nature of practical 
deliberation that one may deliberate only about issues one takes oneself 
to be able to settle through the formation of an intention. Velleman’s argu-
ment is, on the face of it, appealing, but also requires elaboration. One such 
an elaboration might go as follows. In deliberating about whether to φ, one 
uses the concept of an intention to φ, that is, the concept of an attitude 
that, among other things, normally settles the issue of one’s φ-ing in the 
world. So, when one is engaged in practical deliberation about whether to 
φ, and thus has the concept of intention in mind, one is aware that in order 
for one to intend to φ, the issue of one’s φ-ing has to be such that were one 
18 In other words, the fact that one will φ is “coherently explained” by the fact that one 
intends to φ and the fact that one’s intention to φ will lead to one’s φ-ing. Here I am 
assuming that, for Harman, what really does the work in the direction of explanatory 
coherence is limited to one’s relevant beliefs.
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to intend to φ, one’s would φ in fact—at least, in the normal case. And it is 
this awareness that somehow impels one to form the intention to φ within 
deliberation only if one believes that one will φ as a result of this very 
 intention. Or so it might be suggested.
The arguments by Harman and Velleman raise many interesting questions. 
One of them is whether the settle condition applies to all intentions, to 
those formed through deliberation and to those formed through nonde-
liberative processes alike, as Harman seems to think, or whether it applies 
only to the former, as Velleman’s argument seems to presuppose. I will not 
attempt to answer this question in this paper. Nor is my aim here to assess 
the force of the cited two arguments. I mention such arguments mainly 
to highlight that despite its strong initial plausibility, the case for the 
settle condition on intention is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. 
As suggested above, Velleman’s argument is appealing but underspecified, 
whereas Harman’s argument, even if successful, rests on assumptions about 
contentious questions such as the doxastic elements of intention, the trans-
parency of this attitude, and the aims of practical reasoning. My main goal 
in the remainder of this paper is to argue for the claim that if intention is 
subject to the settle condition, this condition is better understood as framed 
by a cognitive attitude other than belief––though, as we will see in  section 3.8, 
our discussion will also lead us to an alternative argument for the truth 
of the antecedent of that conditional claim. To see what that other cogni-
tive attitude is, it is useful to consider how the settle condition applies in a 
different context, one in which the question of whether one is in a position 
to settle or control a relevant issue by forming an intention is particularly 
salient to oneself. This is the context of shared agency.
3.4 THE SETTLE CONDITION AND SHARED AGENCY
It is a familiar idea that we may explain my intentionally doing something 
in terms of mainly my intention to do so. In like manner, it has been sug-
gested, we may explain our intentionally doing something together in terms 
of our “shared” or “collective” intention to do it. But what is it for you and 
I to share an intention to act together? According to Bratman’s influential 
account, our shared intention to act together is basically a complex struc-
ture of intentions of each of us in favor of the joint activity (1999a, 2014). 
If you and I share an intention to dance the tango, it will be true, among 
other things, that I intend that we dance the tango and you intend that we 
dance the tango. In reaction to this account, Velleman has incisively argued 
that the settle condition on intention poses however a serious challenge 
to the coherence of the idea that I may intend our activity (1997). In order 
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for me to intend that we act, Velleman notes, I must think of myself as 
settling the matter of our acting, which involves my seeing myself as settling 
not only what I am going to do in our acting but also what you are going to 
do in it as well. The problem, Velleman argues, is that this seems to be 
incompatible with my thinking of you as also intending that we act, and 
thereby, as also settling the matter of our acting. For, Velleman avers, “one 
person’s exercise of discretion over some issue would seem to exclude any 
other person from exercising discretion over the same issue” (1997: 34).19 
Simply put, Velleman’s worry is that it is not clear that in intending that we 
act I may see myself as settling the issue of our acting, since it is not clear 
that my so intending may settle that issue in a way that is compatible with 
your intention’s settling it as well.
Bratman offers an ingenious response to the challenge. Like Velleman, 
Bratman thinks that the settle condition is “a plausible constraint” on an 
individual’s intention in favor of joint activity and sees it as “related” to the 
settling feature of intention mentioned in section 3.2. If you and I share an 
intention to J—where J is a joint activity—and thus each of us intends that 
we J, Bratman says, “it seems that each of us needs to believe that his inten-
tion really does settle whether we J.” But then, Bratman notes, it also seems 
that to establish that each of us could “coherently” intend that we J—that 
is, intend that we J in a way that is responsive to Velleman’s worries about 
“shared discretion” above—it must be shown that we “could both be right” 
in having the cited belief (2014: 65). To this purpose, Bratman invites us 
to think of a scenario where the following conditions hold: (a) each of us 
intends (or will intend) that we J; (b) there is “persistence interdependence” 
of our intentions in (a), that is, each continues to so intend if and only if (he 
recognizes that) the other also continues to so intend; and (c) if each of us 
intends as in (a), we will J, by way of those very intentions and in the right 
way (2014: 65–6). In that scenario, Bratman argues, “each of our intentions 
in (a) will settle whether we J in part by way of its support of the intention 
of the other” (2014: 66). That is, our intentions in (a) will each lead to our 
J-ing, by way of their mutual support as described in (b) and in the way 
specified by (c). But then, Bratman notes, it seems that we “could both be 
right” in believing that his own intention settles whether we J just in case we 
each believe that conditions (a)–(c) hold and such beliefs are true (2014: 
76–7). In such a case, each of our “interdependent” intentions that we J will 
19 The challenge is formulated in slightly different terms by Baier (1997: 25). Both 
Velleman and Baier note that the challenge does not arise for cases of shared intention in 
which a member of the group has authority or control over the others (Velleman 1997: 
34, Baier 1997: 25).
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settle in the world an issue that is up to us—our J-ing—and each of us will see 
the intentions of each as settling that issue.20
It is important to call attention to the structure of Bratman’s response.  In 
showing how we “could both be right” in believing that each of our inten-
tions settle that we J, Bratman is in fact providing an answer to two (related 
but still) different questions. First, he is explaining how intentions that we 
act can satisfy a relevant settle condition. We “both can coherently intend 
that we J, where these intentions satisfy the settle condition,” Bratman says, 
if we both believe that conditions (a)–(c) hold (2014: 66, 76–7). Thus, in 
contrast to the larger question of “how we could both be right,” the satisfac-
tion of the settle condition by the intentions of each does not require that 
our beliefs about conditions (a)–(c) be true. After all, intentions sometimes 
fail to be executed without this undermining their status as genuine  intentions; 
intentions in favor of a joint activity are no exception. The further condi-
tion that our beliefs about (a)–(c) be true connects to a second question 
Bratman is giving an answer to with the cited response. This has to do with 
a worry that affects intentions that we act in particular. The worry is whether 
such intentions could ever be executed—that is, could ever settle an issue in 
the world—and Bratman’s answer is that they are executed (roughly) when 
conditions (a)–(c) are met.
I agree with Bratman that it is a theoretically fruitful strategy to under-
stand the shared intention of a group of individuals to act together partly 
in terms of the intentions of each in favor of the joint activity. And I have 
myself pursued a similar strategy in developing an alternative view of the 
nature of shared intention (Alonso 2009, 2016b). I also think that the gen-
eral structure of Bratman’s response to Velleman’s incoherence challenge 
is along the right lines.21 Notwithstanding all this, I disagree with a central 
aspect of Bratman’s response. I think that understanding the relevant set-
tle condition on the intentions of each individual in terms of belief is too 
strong and thus rules out many genuine cases of intending a joint activity 
as “incoherent.”22 For in some cases I lack or cannot form the belief that 
my intention settles whether we act—that is, the belief that if I intend that 
20 For further discussion, see Bratman (1999b: 148–60, 2014: 64–78).
21 Velleman agrees as well (1997: 33–4, fn. 11).
22 It is worth noting that Bratman is not himself committed to understanding the 
settle condition on intention—in favor of either a joint activity or one’s own action—in 
terms of belief, and in fact suggests an alternative interpretation of that condition 
elsewhere (1999c: 32), an interpretation that is in the spirit of the proposal I offer below. 
However, Bratman’s strategy in responding to Velleman’s incoherence challenge is to 
argue that an individual’s intention in favor of a joint activity can meet a relevant settle 
condition, even when the latter is interpreted in the challenge’s terms, that is, in terms of 
belief. Here I benefitted from personal communication with Bratman.
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we act, then we will act—because I lack one or more of the other beliefs 
from which I can normally derive it—that is, the beliefs that conditions 
(a)–(c) hold—23and it seems that I may intend that we act in such cases 
nonetheless.24
Consider the following example. I very much want to dance the tango 
with Maria, an excellent tango dancer, and I invite her to a tango party next 
Saturday. She tells me that she will think about it and will let me know. I am 
not surprised by her response. I know Maria to be an indecisive person. She 
usually has trouble making up her mind. So, given what I know about her 
character, I do not now believe on reflection that she will intend that we 
dance. But I do not believe that she will not so intend, either. My evidence 
on that matter is neutral. Here we may ask: Can I form the intention that 
Maria and I dance the tango on Saturday under such circumstances? If we 
adopted the belief conception of the settle condition (SCB) as our relevant 
standard, our answer would be negative. For in such circumstances I lack the 
belief that Maria intends (or will come to intend) that we dance—I lack 
the belief that condition (a) holds—and so do not believe on reflection that 
my intention will settle the issue of whether we dance. I think, however, 
that SCB gives us the wrong answer here. In order for me to intend that 
Maria and I dance the tango on Saturday I do not need to believe that my 
intention will settle the issue of whether we dance. It suffices that I rely on 
my intention’s settling that issue, and that seems possible even in the absence 
of belief. Therefore, in order for me to intend that we dance, I need not 
believe that conditions (a)–(c) hold; it suffices that I rely on such conditions 
to hold. It is likewise for Maria.25 Two questions immediately arise here: 
What is reliance? And how does it differ from belief?
3.5 RELIANCE AND BELIEF
In my view, reliance is, like belief, but unlike desire, a cognitive attitude, 
rather than a conative one.26 Reliance and belief have as a function to cogni-
tively guide (or frame) one’s thought and action. Each of relying on p and 
23 For the purposes of our discussion, I assume that a relevant settle condition on 
intentions that we act must be (cognitively) responsive to conditions (a)–(c) above.
24 In what follows I build partly on ideas discussed in previous work (Alonso 2009).
25 Certainly, if Maria and I each eventually form the intention that we dance, partly 
in reliance on conditions (a)–(c) to hold, and if those conditions do hold, then both our 
intentions that we dance will have settled the issue of our dancing the tango in fact—that 
is, they will have led us to dance the tango together in an appropriate way.
26 In this section I appeal to a view of reliance I have developed in greater detail 
 elsewhere (Alonso 2014, 2016a).
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of believing that p disposes one to deliberate, plan, and act on the basis of 
p under relevant conditions. Suppose that I want to climb down a rock and 
that I am wondering about whether a piece of rope will hold my weight. If 
under such conditions I relied on the rope’s holding my weight, then 
I would be disposed to, for example, form the intention to climb down the 
rock, deliberate about what strategy to employ in my descent, and make 
certain moves, all based on the premise that the rope will hold my weight; 
it is likewise if in those circumstances I believed that the rope would hold 
my weight. Despite such similarities, however, reliance differs from belief in 
many ways. A central difference for our purposes has to do with the norms 
of correctness for such attitudes and, thus, with the grounds on the basis 
of which such attitudes are justified. Belief is correct—at least, according to 
a familiar conception—just in case it is true. One’s belief that p is correct 
if and only if p is true.27 In contrast, reliance is correct, as I have suggested 
elsewhere (2014, 2016a), just in case it provides “sensible guidance,” that is, 
just in case it cognitively guides one’s reasoning in a way that is instrumental 
to one’s relevant ends and values.28
To get at this idea of sensible guidance, we need first to consider some 
aspects of the descriptive, factual relation between reliance and truth. It 
seems clear that in some cases one’s reliance is directed at—that is, it func-
tions so as to track—the truth. Roughly, to say that one’s reliance on p 
is  directed at the truth in some cases is to say that in those cases one is 
 disposed to rely on p only if p is the case. For example, my reliance on the 
rope’s holding my weight is directed at reflecting whether the rope actually 
holds my weight, and thus I am disposed to continue to so rely as long 
as I do not find (perhaps conclusive) evidence that the rope will not hold 
my weight. However, there are some other cases in which reliance is not 
directed at the truth. In those cases, one is not disposed to rely on p only 
if p. Rather than being directed at representing some actual state of affairs, 
in those other cases reliance is directed at picturing—or presenting to one’s 
mind—some non-actual state of affairs as obtaining. Imagine a mathematician 
who assumes that p—that is, relies on p—for the purposes of a reductio 
(Velleman 2000: 112–13). It seems clear that in the context of constructing 
such a proof, the mathematician may rely on p without much concern as to 
whether p is true or, even, while thinking that p is false.
27 See, esp. Williams (1973), Wedgwood (2002), and Shah (2003). Note that to con-
ceive of truth as the norm for belief is compatible with acknowledging that this attitude 
is, as a matter of psychological fact, sometimes influenced by pragmatic considerations. 
On the connection between the normative and the descriptive aspects of belief (and of 
reliance), see Alonso (2014).
28 I argue elsewhere that a normative contrast between reliance and belief remains 
even if we reject the claim that truth is the norm for belief (Alonso 2016a: 332).
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The next point to note is that reliance can play its characteristic role of 
cognitively guiding one’s reasoning irrespective of whether it is also playing 
a truth-tracking role. When one’s reliance on p is directed at the truth, it 
guides one’s reasoning on the basis of p, but when it is not directed at the 
truth, it guides one’s reasoning on the basis of p all the same. In both cases, 
one is disposed to deliberate, plan, and act on the basis of p. When I rely on 
the rope’s holding my weight, my reliance frames my reasoning accordingly. 
I intend to climb down a rock, deliberate about different climbing strategies, 
and make certain moves, in light of the premise that the rope will hold my 
weight. But when the mathematician relies on p for the purposes of an 
indirect proof, her reliance guides her reasoning accordingly, too. She draws 
conclusions from and structures her proof on the premise that p.
It follows from the previous points, then, that there are two basic ways 
in which reliance may provide sensible guidance—that is, cognitive guid-
ance that is instrumental to one’s relevant end. First, reliance may provide 
sensible guidance in part by being successful in tracking the truth. More 
precisely, one’s reliance on p may sensibly guide one’s reasoning only if 
(i) one relies on p only if p and (ii) p is true. My reliance on the rope’s 
holding my weight may frame my deliberation, planning, and action in 
ways conducive to my end of climbing down the rock only if the rope 
actually holds my weight and my reliance accurately reflects that fact. 
I call this form of sensible guidance, “truth-directed sensible guidance.” 
Second, reliance may provide sensible guidance without being responsive to 
the truth. Specifically, one’s reliance on p may sensibly guide one’s reasoning 
even if it is the case neither that (i) one relies on p only if p nor that (ii) p is 
true. The mathematician’s non-truth-directed reliance on p may guide her 
reasoning in ways conducive to her end of constructing the desired proof, 
irrespective of the question of whether p really is true. This is because the 
attainment of her end does not require that p be true. Call this, “non-truth-
directed sensible guidance.” Thus, for reliance not only the question of 
cognitive guidance but also the question of sensible cognitive guidance can 
be independent of the question of truth.
Having laid down the main ideas concerning the norm for reliance, we 
must consider next what the justification of reliance basically involves. Given 
the cited norm, we may say that one is justified in relying on p in a certain 
context only if (i) one has a relevant end in that context, and (ii) one has 
good reasons for believing that one’s relying on p is a means to attaining 
such an end. Further, given our earlier distinction between truth-directed 
and non-truth-directed sensible guidance, we may say that one’s reliance is 
justified in the former cases only if it satisfies in addition an evidential 
 constraint. For present purposes, let us assume that a plausible candidate for 
this constraint is that one should not have sufficient evidence to believe that 
what one relies on is false (Wright 2004, cf. Alonso 2016a). This brings us 
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back to the settle  condition on intention. For it seems that they are cases of 
truth-directed reliance that are especially relevant to it—that is, cases in 
which one’s reliance will be instrumental to one’s end only if it succeeds in 
tracking the truth. Thus, my reliance on Maria’s intending that we dance 
the tango may guide my reasoning in ways that lead to our dancing the 
tango together only if she does in fact so intend and my reliance accurately 
reflects that fact.
Return now to the contrast between reliance and belief. We may say that 
these attitudes articulate the functions of tracking the truth and of provid-
ing sensible guidance quite differently. Belief ’s primary function is to track 
the truth, although in some cases this attitude also provides sensible guidance 
in virtue of playing such truth-tracking role. In contrast, reliance’s primary 
function is to provide sensible guidance, although in order to do this it must 
in some cases track the truth. What is more, we may say that the norms of 
correctness for such attitudes establish a two-fold contrast with respect 
to how they are justified: while belief can be justified solely by evidence for 
its truth, reliance can be justified on the basis of both evidential and prag-
matic considerations; and while belief justification requires one to have suf-
ficient evidence for its truth, reliance justification (in cases of truth-directed 
guidance)29 requires one to lack sufficient evidence for its falsity.
3.6 INTENTION, RELIANCE, AND THE SETTLE 
CONDITION
In section 3.5 I specified how I conceive of the attitudes of reliance and 
of belief. Let me now briefly note how I conceive of intention. I subscribe 
to a conative account of intention of the type mentioned in section 3.2. 
As  we saw, conative accounts share with doxastic accounts the idea that 
intention is an attitude that settles a course of action in one’s mind and—if 
all goes well—in the world, but the former reject the further idea embraced 
by the latter that settling a course of action in one’s mind entails believing 
that one will succeed in its pursuit. On a conative account, to be settled on 
a course of action in one’s mind is to be determined to act or to be resolved 
upon acting, and this is to be in a distinctive conative state that involves a 
robust commitment to action (Bratman 1987, cf. Mele 1992).
With these basic ideas about intention, reliance, and belief in mind, let 
us go back to our discussion of an appropriate settle condition on intentions 
in favor of a joint activity. Recall our tango example. In such a case, we 
29 I drop the qualification in what follows.
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said, I have neither the belief nor sufficient evidence to believe that Maria 
intends (or will intend) that we dance at the party, but may nonetheless rely 
on her so intending. Now we see that such reliance may well be justified. 
For, in that case I have a relevant end (dancing the tango with Maria is 
something I value or care about), my reliance satisfies the evidential con-
straint for reliance justification (I do not have sufficient evidence to believe 
that Maria will not eventually form her relevant intention), and I may have 
good reason to believe that my reliance on her intending that we dance will 
cognitively guide my thought and action in ways that lead to that end. To 
put it in terms of Bratman’s conditions (a)–(c) noted earlier, I may rely on 
condition (a) to hold in that case and such reliance may be justified. Similar 
considerations would apply if I relied on conditions (b) and (c) to hold in 
such a case. Once this is acknowledged, it becomes clear that I may form the 
intention that Maria and I dance the tango on the basis of my reliance on 
conditions (a)–(c) to hold and that this reliance may be justified even if 
belief in such conditions is not. These remarks support the conclusion that 
reliance on conditions (a)–(c) satisfies an appropriate settle condition on 
intending a joint activity and thus the proposal that we conceive of this very 
condition in terms of reliance. In order for me to intend that we act, I must 
rely on my intention’s settling the issue of our acting.
I want to suggest now that a parallel argument exists in favor of a reliance-
based conception of the settled condition as applied to intentions about 
one’s own actions. A first point to note is that the doxastic conception (SCB) 
is too strong with respect to these intentions as well. There are various cases 
in which one intends to do something but has neither the belief that one’s 
intention will settle one’s action nor sufficient reasons (evidence) for having 
such a belief. A smoker may now intend to quit smoking, even though he 
has tried and failed in the past, and at the moment does not believe, reason-
ably or not, that he will succeed this time. More generally, it is apparent that 
sometimes we embark upon difficult projects where it is not clear to us 
whether we are going to succeed, and it is not far-fetched to think that we 
intend some of those projects. But if it is true that intention must be cog-
nitively framed by an appropriate settle condition, in such cases the cited 
condition will have to be conceived of in terms of a cognitive attitude other 
than belief. My suggestion is that it will have to be conceived of in terms of 
reliance. To state this conception more precisely:
Settle Condition–Reliance (SCR): One may intend to φ only if one relies on the 
conditional proposition that if one intends to φ, one will φ.30
30 For the sake of simplicity, here I have stated SCR for the case of intentions about 
one’s own actions.
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The smoker may continue to harbor serious doubts as to the causal 
 efficacy of a prospective intention to stop smoking. But he may also now 
realize that irreversible consequences for his health will soon ensue if he 
does not stop smoking immediately and thus may now feel more pressure 
to stop smoking than he has felt before. Under these circumstances, the 
smoker may decide to rely on the causal efficacy of the cited intention 
and proceed to form it on the basis of such reliance. Furthermore, his 
 reliance may be justified in the circumstances. After all, he has very good 
pragmatic reasons to stop smoking and may lack sufficient reason to 
believe that he will fail. In like manner, to appeal to a version of Velleman’s 
example given earlier, an unskilled but yet determined marksman may 
lack a belief in the conditional proposition that if he were to intend to hit 
a target, he would succeed, and yet it is plausible to think that he may 
form such an intention in that case. He may intend to hit the target so 
long as he relies on the cited conditional proposition to hold; what is 
more, his reliance may well be justified.
My suggestion, then, is that if intention is indeed subject to an appropriate 
settle condition, it is more plausible to conceive of such a condition in 
terms of reliance than in terms of belief. There are two arguments that 
support this suggestion. The first has to do with explanatory scope, and 
it stems partly from our earlier reflections. Since reliance is subject to a 
less stringent epistemic (evidential) constraint than belief is, conceiving of 
the cognitive constraint on intending in terms of reliance, as suggested by 
SCR, allows us to make room for, and also make sense of, many ordinary 
instances of intending that are ruled out by the doxastic conception of the 
constraint, SCB. For in many cases the relevant belief cannot be (reason-
ably) had, and yet it seems that one is in a position to form an intention 
to act in such cases. But, in addition, and here we go beyond our earlier 
reflections, the reliance conception of the constraint, SCR, accounts for all 
the instances of intending that are accounted for by the doxastic concep-
tion, SCB. This is because belief brings about reliance in such cases. When 
I frame my intention to φ by the belief in the conditional proposition 
that  if I intend to φ, I will φ, this belief gives way to a corresponding 
 attitude  of reliance. In this context, my belief is not merely satisfying 
an intellectual curiosity, but is primarily framing my intention-forming 
process. It is cognitively guiding my reasoning. But as soon as my belief 
starts playing this framing or guiding role, it gives rise to a mental state 
that can be appropriately assessed in terms of, and is typically guided 
by,  its instrumentality in playing such a role; that is, it gives rise to an 
attitude of reliance. This suggests that the settle condition on intention 
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not only can be conceived of in terms of reliance, but also that it must 
be so conceived.31
We think and act in light of a cognitive framework. The idea that SCR 
can explain all the cases that can be explained by SCB and, in addition, that 
SCR can explain other cases which SCB cannot, is an instance of a more 
general point that reliance is more tightly connected, both descriptively and 
normatively, to the cognitive framing of our thought and action than belief 
is. The point is partly captured by the contrast, drawn earlier, between the 
primary functions of such attitudes: while the primary function of belief is 
to track the truth, we said, the primary function of reliance is to provide 
sensible cognitive guidance.32 Accordingly, SCR construes the settle condi-
tion as pointing not so much to an epistemic constraint on intending, but 
to a cognitive one. Its role is to cognitively frame one’s intention-forming 
processes. Furthermore, since according to SCR the settle condition is itself 
a form of reliance, we know that this condition can stably play this framing 
role irrespective of whether it is also playing a truth-tracking role. Therefore, 
on this conception, it is the cognitive framing of intention, rather than the 
search for a certain truth, that the settle condition primarily seeks to track.
The second argument for favoring SCR over SCB connects to the “thesis 
that intention involves belief.”
3.7 INTENTION, RELIANCE, AND THE ANTICIPATION 
OF ONE’S FUTURE ACTION
According to the doxastic account of intention, we saw in section 3.2, 
 intending to act is a special kind of belief that one will so act, or necessarily 
involves such a belief. For supporters of this account, this connection 
between intention and belief promises to elucidate a myriad of important 
issues in the philosophy of action and practical reasoning. Among others, 
it promises to shed light on the Anscombian suggestion that the mark of 
intentional action is given by the knowledge one has of one’s action while 
performing it (Velleman 1989, Setiya 2007a, 2008), on the grounds for the 
norms of practical reasoning (Harman  1976, Davis  1984, Setiya  2007b, 
31 Here it might be pointed out that there are other cognitive attitudes, other than 
belief and reliance, which could play this framing role. My intuition, however, is that any 
such other cognitive attitude, if it did play such a role, would give rise to an attitude of 
reliance as well. But I cannot argue for this here.
32 I provide additional support for this general point in Alonso (2014, 2016a).
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Velleman 2007), and on the role that intention plays in the coordination of 
one’s thought and action (Harman 1976, Velleman 2007).
Despite its explanatory potential, some versions of the doxastic account—
namely, those that regard intention as being itself a kind of belief—have 
nonetheless been charged with portraying intention as involving a criticizable 
form of “wishful thinking” (Grice 1971) or “faith” (Langton 2004). Paul Grice 
famously argued that an account that equates intention with a kind of belief 
falters, because such “intention-belief ” could never be justified by the evi-
dence. If my intention-belief that I will φ is to be causally efficacious in my 
φ-ing, then having satisfactory evidence that I will φ will involve having 
evidence that I intend-believe that I will φ. But then I cannot come to 
intend-believe that I will φ on the basis of satisfactory evidence, since to 
have such evidence it must already be the case that I so intend-believe (1971: 
274). Furthermore, Grice noted, it is plausible that my only motivation 
for my having an intention-belief that I will φ—that is, what explains why I 
have it—is that I want to φ or think I ought to φ. But then, Grice  concluded, 
it seems that the cited account “represents having an intention as being a 
case of licensed wishful thinking” (1971: 262).33 Going a step further than 
Grice, Rae Langton has recently contended that such doxastic accounts 
assimilate intention to a form of “faith” (2004).34 Not only do such accounts 
assume that the relevant intention-belief is caused by a desire for its fulfill-
ment, which makes that attitude a form of wishful thinking. They also pre-
suppose that the intention-belief is causally efficacious in leading one to 
action, which makes it a self-fulfilling attitude. Therefore, on such accounts, 
intention is a form of self-fulfilling wishful thinking, that is, a form of faith. 
To have faith that one will φ is to have a belief that one will φ that is 
(i)  created by one’s desire to φ (wishful) and that (ii) causes one’s φ-ing 
(self-fulfilling) (Langton 2004: 243). But this is also what to intend-believe 
that one will φ involves, according to such accounts. Or so Langton argues.
Supporters of the doxastic account have responded to such type of objections 
in different ways.35 But I will not focus on this dispute here. I want instead to 
argue that the reliance conception of the settle condition on intention (SCR) 
proposed above affords conative accounts of intention resources to help explain 
the tight connection that exists between intention and the anticipation of one’s 
future action, but in a way that sidesteps the epistemological  worries that 
threaten to beset the aforementioned doxastic accounts. It  portrays intention 
33 Here I have greatly benefitted from Harman’s discussion of Grice’s work (1986b).
34 Langton’s objection is directed primarily to Velleman’s account (1989). But the 
objection applies in principle also to other accounts that assimilate intention to a kind of 
belief, such as the ones provided by Hampshire and Hart (1958), Harman (1976), and 
Setiya (2007a, 2008).
35 See, among others, Harman (1986b), Velleman (1989), and Setiya (2008).
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as involving a species of neither “wishful thinking” nor “faith.” This is the 
second argument for favoring SCR over SCB mentioned in  section 3.6.
The argument comprises two steps. The first is to note that SCR allows us 
to explain why one’s intending to act is tightly connected to the anticipation 
of one’s future action or, to put it more precisely, why in intending to φ one 
will normally rely on one’s φ-ing. When one intends to φ, one also relies on 
the conditional proposition that if one intends to φ, one will φ. But if one 
is conscious of all this, one will also normally conclude that one will φ 
(where this conclusion need not involve belief ) and will be disposed to use 
such a conclusion as a premise in further deliberation, planning and action. 
In short, one will normally rely on one’s φ-ing.36 The second step is to note 
that once we put together a conative account of intention with the just cited 
conception of the connection between intention and the anticipation of 
one’s future action, we arrive at a view of intention that portrays this  attitude 
as involving neither wishful thinking nor faith. According to  this view, 
intending to φ is a conative attitude that need not involve  believing that one 
will φ, but that normally results in one’s relying on one’s φ-ing. Is the latter 
attitude a form of wishful thinking or faith that one will φ? Wishful think-
ing, as understood by Grice and Langton, is belief  created by desire. 
However, reliance is not this. For, while reliance may be created by desire, it 
need not involve belief.37 Nor is reliance what Langton calls “faith,” that is, 
self-fulfilling wishful thinking. For, in addition to not necessarily involving 
wishful thinking, reliance need not be self-fulfilling, either. As suggested 
earlier, reliance is a cognitive attitude, rather than a conative one. Its role is 
to cognitively guide action, not to motivate it. In the present view, it is the 
conative attitude of intention instead that moves one to act. Therefore, 
since this view represents intention as involving neither wishful thinking 
nor faith, it avoids the epistemological worries mentioned earlier.
3.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper I have argued that if intention is subject to a relevant settle 
condition, this condition is better understood in terms of reliance than in 
36 Here it is important to highlight the contrast between the condition that one rely 
on one’s φ-ing and the condition that one rely on the conditional proposition that if one 
intends to φ one will φ. The latter points to a pre-condition on intending to φ—namely, 
to the settle condition; the former to a cognitive element that normally emerges as a 
result of, or together with, one’s intending to φ. The latter has to do with a cognition 
necessary to support intention; the former with a cognition about one’s future action that 
intention normally supports, once formed.
37 In section 3.5 I distinguished reliance from belief mainly on normative grounds. For 
 discussion of some of the psychological differences between such attitudes, see Alonso (2014).
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terms of belief. I want to conclude with some remarks on the question of 
whether intention is, in fact, subject to such a condition. Return to the 
preceding discussion of the connection between intention and the antici-
pation of future action. Doxastic accounts usually regard the connection 
they posit between intention and belief in future action as pointing to the 
epistemic role that the latter attitude is assumed to play in one’s practical 
thought and action. For example, doxastic accounts inspired by Anscombe—
such as those by Velleman (1989) and by Setiya (2007a, 2008)—stress the 
epistemic role that the cited belief plays in securing knowledge of one’s own 
actions, which constitutes in their view the—or, at least, a—mark of inten-
tional agency. In contrast, the suggested connection, which resulted from 
putting together SCR with a conative account of intention, between inten-
tion and reliance on future action does not point to the epistemic role that 
the latter attitude could play in securing the cited knowledge. It points 
rather to the cognitive role that such reliance can play in one’s thought and 
action. Most importantly for our purposes, it points to the cognitive role 
that reliance on future action plays in framing further intentions, and thus 
in facilitating the coordination of one’s intentions and actions. In intending 
to φ, we saw, one normally relies on one’s φ-ing. But since to rely on one’s 
φ-ing is in part to be disposed to form  further intentions on the premise 
that one will φ, it is not difficult to see how reliance on future action may 
assist intention in the coordination of one’s planning and action, both over 
time and interpersonally. Thus, the reliance conception of the settle condi-
tion (SCR) affords conative accounts of intention with useful resources for 
explaining the coordinating role of intention and for doing so in a way that 
is compatible with their rejection of “the thesis that intention involves 
belief.”38 This is the alternative argument for a properly understood settle 
condition on intention I anticipated in section 3.3.39
38 This suggests a response to a recent objection raised by Velleman (2007: 204ff) 
against conative accounts of intention such as Bratman’s (1987), according to which in 
order to make sense of the coordinating role of intention we must assume that the latter 
attitude involves belief.
39 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at King’s College, London, the Third 
New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR), and the 2016 Varieties 
of Agency Workshop at Stanford University. I want to thank those audiences for valuable 
discussions. I am indebted to Maria Alvarez, Ben Bayer, Nathan Biebel, Olle Blomberg, 
Michael Bratman, Bill Brewer, Rachael Briggs, John Broome, Randolph Clarke, Jorah 
Dannenberg, Julia Driver, David Hills, Suzy Killmister, David Papineau, Herlinde 
Pauer-Studer, Derk Pereboom, Abe Roth, Andrea Sangiovanni, David Shoemaker, Sarah 
Stroud, Manuel Vargas, and two anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press for 
helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to Carlos Núñez, who served as a 
commentator at the Varieties of Agency Workshop, for his insightful remarks.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 21/06/17, SPi
Intending, Settling, and Relying 73
References
Alonso, Facundo. (2009). “Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations”. 
Ethics 119: 444–75.
Alonso, Facundo. (2014). “What is Reliance?”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
44: 163–83.
Alonso, Facundo. (2016a). “Reasons for Reliance” Ethics 126: 311–38.
Alonso, Facundo. (2016b). “A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention”. Journal of 
Social Ontology 2: 271–302.
Baier, Annette. (1970). “Act and Intent”. Journal of Philosophy 67: 648–58.
Baier, Annette. (1997). “Doing Things with Others: The Mental Commons,” in 
Commonality and Particularity in Ethics, pp. 15–44. L. S. Alanen, Heinämma, and 
T. Wallgren (eds.). (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
Bratman, Michael. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press).
Bratman, Michael. (1999a). Faces of Intention. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press).
Bratman, Michael. (1999b). “I Intend that We J,” reprinted in Faces of Intention, 
pp. 142–61.
Bratman, Michael. (1999c). “Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context,” 
reprinted in Faces of Intention, pp. 15–34.
Bratman, Michael. (2009). “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” in Spheres of 
Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, pp. 29–61. Simon Robertson 
(ed.). (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Bratman, Michael. (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Davis, Wayne. (1984). “A Causal Theory of Intending,” reprinted in The Philosophy 
of Action, pp. 131–48. A. Mele (ed.). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Grice, Paul. (1971). “Intention and Uncertainty”. The Proceedings of the British 
Academy 57: 263–79.
Hampshire Stuart and H. L. A. Hart. (1958). “Decision, Intention, and Uncertainty.” 
Mind 67: 1–12.
Harman, Gilbert. (1976). “Practical Reasoning.” Review of Metaphysics 29: 431–63.
Harman, Gilbert. (1986a). Change in View. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Harman, Gilbert. (1986b). “Willing and Intending,” in Philosophical Grounds of 
Rationality, pp. 363–80. R. E. Grandy and R. Warner (eds.). (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).
Langton, Rae. (2004). “Intention as Faith,” in Agency and Action, pp. 243–58. 
J. Hyman and H. Steward (eds.). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Mele, Alfred. (1992). Springs of Action. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Setiya, Kieran. (2007a). Reasons without Rationalism. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press).
Setiya, Kieran. (2007b). “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason”. Ethics 117: 647–73.
Setiya, Kieran. (2008). “Practical Knowledge”. Ethics 118: 388–409.
Shah, Nishi. (2003). “How Truth Governs Belief ”. Philosophical Review 112: 447–82.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 21/06/17, SPi
Facundo M. Alonso74
Velleman, J. David. (1989). Practical Reflection. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press).
Velleman, J. David. (1991). “Review of Michael Bratman’s Intention, Plans, and 
Practical Reason”. Philosophical Review 100: 277–84.
Velleman, J. David. (1997). “How to Share an Intention.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 57: 29–50.
Velleman, J. David. (2000). “The Guise of the Good,” reprinted in The Possibility of 
Practical Reason, pp. 99–122. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Velleman, J. David. (2007). “What Good is a Will?” in Action in Context, pp. 193–215. 
A. Leist. (ed.). (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter).
Wedgwood, Ralph. (2002). “The Aim of Belief.” Philosophical Perspectives 16: 
267–97.
Williams, Bernard. (1973). “Deciding to Believe,” in Problems of the Self, pp. 136–51. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Wright, Crispin. (2004). “Warrant for Nothing (And Foundations for Free)?” 
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78: 167–212.
